ReadonlycategoryWhich trap category this detector addresses
ReadonlyidUnique identifier for this detector
ReadonlynameHuman-readable name
Protected ReadonlytrapProtectedredactLast chance to alter matched text before it becomes Threat.evidence.
Evidence travels: into ScanResult, the CLI's JSON/SARIF output, audit
records, and whatever the caller logs. For most detectors the matched text
IS the finding and must be preserved verbatim. For a detector whose matches
are themselves secrets, echoing them would leak the credential into exactly
the CI logs and audit trails the scan was meant to protect. Override to
redact; the default is identity.
Sanitization is unaffected — it works from Threat.location, not evidence.
Return sanitized content with threats neutralized. content is the
original scanned text, never text another detector has already edited, so
the threats' offsets are valid in it. Each detector's change is merged
with the others' and applied once.
Scan content and return any threats found
Optionaloptions: DetectorOptions
Detects instructions injected via HTML metadata channels that agents parse but humans don't see: HTML comments, aria-label, alt text, meta tags.
Research shows that injecting adversarial instructions into HTML elements like metadata and aria-label tags alters generated summaries in 15-29% of cases (Verma and Yadav, 2025).