Agent Armor API Reference
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    Class SyntacticMaskingDetector

    Detects payloads hidden in formatting language syntax (Markdown, LaTeX).

    Reference: Keuper (2025) — white-on-white or tiny-font LaTeX text in scientific manuscripts survives PDF-to-Markdown conversion.

    Hierarchy (View Summary)

    Index
    category: TrapCategory = 'content-injection'

    Which trap category this detector addresses

    id: "syntactic-masking" = 'syntactic-masking'

    Unique identifier for this detector

    name: "Syntactic Masking Detector" = 'Syntactic Masking Detector'

    Human-readable name

    trapType: TrapType = 'syntactic-masking'
    • Last chance to alter matched text before it becomes Threat.evidence.

      Evidence travels: into ScanResult, the CLI's JSON/SARIF output, audit records, and whatever the caller logs. For most detectors the matched text IS the finding and must be preserved verbatim. For a detector whose matches are themselves secrets, echoing them would leak the credential into exactly the CI logs and audit trails the scan was meant to protect. Override to redact; the default is identity.

      Sanitization is unaffected — it works from Threat.location, not evidence.

      Parameters

      • match: string

      Returns string

    • Return sanitized content with threats neutralized. content is the original scanned text, never text another detector has already edited, so the threats' offsets are valid in it. Each detector's change is merged with the others' and applied once.

      Parameters

      • content: string
      • threats: Threat[]

      Returns string